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Abstract
In this paper the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games is analysed. It turns out that the
classical result for the set of equilibria for bimatrix games, that it is a ﬁnite union of polytopes, is only valid for
multicriteria games if one of the players only has two pure strategies. A full polyhedral description of these polytopes
can be derived when the player with an arbitrary number of pure strategies has one criterion.
 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Multicriteria strategic form games were ﬁrst introduced by Blackwell (1956). The diﬀerence between
these games and ordinary strategic form games is that a player in a strategic form game only has one
criterion (his payoﬀ) to evaluate the outcome of the game (i.e. the proﬁle of strategies chosen by the players
of the game) while in a multicriteria game each player may have an arbitrary number of criteria (payoﬀs)
that are intrinsically uncomparable with each other.
Nash (1950, 1951) introduced the notion of an equilibrium for non-cooperative games in strategic form
in his papers. Since then the equilibrium concept has been and still is being studied extensively. One of the
topics in this investigation is the structure of the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game. (A bimatrix game is a
non-cooperative game in strategic form with two players.) Over the last decades a fair number of papers has
been published on this topic. It turned out that the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game is a ﬁnite union of
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polytopes. Proofs of this fact can for example be found in Winkels (1979), Jansen (1981) and Jansen and
Jurg (1990).
From a computational point of view these results are quite important. The main reason for this is that
the original proof of Nash of the existence of equilibria is not constructive. It shows that the assumption
that a non-cooperative game does not have an equilibrium leads to a contradiction. It does therefore not tell
you how to ﬁnd an equilibrium for a given game. Also the basic inequalities in the deﬁnition of the
equilibrium concept are not of much help. In general (without further assumptions on the structure of the
game) these inequalities are polynomial and it is not clear how one can actually calculate one single solution
given these inequalities, let alone how to ﬁnd a parametric representation of the complete set of equilibria.
In the case of bimatrix games life is much simpler. For such a game it is possible to show that the set of
equilibria is a ﬁnite union of polytopes and it is moreover possible to derive a polyhedral description of each
of these polytopes. Hence, by using some theory of linear inequalities, it is possible to compute all extremal
points of such a polytope and in this way ﬁnd a parametric description of the set of equilibria. There are
also a number of exact algorithms for the computation of one speciﬁc equilibrium, such as the algorithm of
Lemke and Howson (1964), that are based on the special structure of the set of equilibria for bimatrix
games.
Although many protocols have been suggested to solve multicriteria games (see e.g. Blackwell, 1956;
Ghose and Prasad, 1989; Fernandez and Puerto, 1996) the notion of Pareto equilibrium, introduced by
Shapley (1959), is the most straightforward generalization of Nash equilibrium. In this paper we investigate
to what extent the results on the structure of the set of Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game can be carried
over to this concept of Pareto equilibrium for two person multicriteria games. Unfortunately our results are
on the negative side of the spectrum. First of all we provide an example to show that the set of equilibria
may have a quadratic component whenever both players have three or more pure strategies and one of the
players has more than one criterion. Secondly we show that the set of equilibria is indeed a ﬁnite union of
polytopes if one of the players has two pure strategies. The actual polyhedral description of these polytopes
cannot be computed directly though, unless the player with an arbitrary number of pure strategies has
exactly one criterion.
2. Preliminaries
In a (two-person multicriteria) game the ﬁrst player has a ﬁnite set M of pure strategies and player two
has a ﬁnite set N of pure strategies. The players are supposed to choose their strategies simultaneously.
Given their choices m 2 M and n 2 N , player one has a ﬁnite set S of criteria to evaluate the pure strategy
pair ðm; nÞ. For each criterion s 2 S the evaluation is a real number ðAsÞmn 2 R. Of course we also have an
evaluation ðBtÞmn 2 R for each criterion t 2 T of player two. Thus the game is speciﬁed by the two sequences
A :¼ ðAsÞs2S and B :¼ ðBtÞt2T
of M  N -matrices
As :¼ ½ðAsÞmnðm;nÞ2MN and Bt :¼ ½ðBtÞmnðm;nÞ2MN :
Despite the fact that the players may have more than one criterion, we will refer to A and B as payoﬀ
matrices. The game is denoted by ðA;BÞ. The players of the game are also allowed to use mixed strategies. 1
Given such mixed strategies p 2 DðMÞ and q 2 DðNÞ for players one and two respectively, the vectors
1 A mixed strategy for a player is simply a probability distribution over his pure strategies. Notation: DðMÞ for player one and DðNÞ
for player two.
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pAq :¼ ðpAsqÞs2S and pBq :¼ ðpBtqÞt2T
are called payoﬀ vectors (for players one and two, respectively).
2.1. Best replies and equilibria
In the context of bimatrix games (games in which each of the two players has exactly one criterion) the
equilibrium concept of Nash is one of the best known ways to solve these games. A very convenient way to
deﬁne equilibria, certainly when one wants to analyze their structure, is by means of best replies.
An analogous approach can be used in the case of multicriteria games. Shapley (1959) ﬁrst introduced
the notion of equilibrium for this type of games. His deﬁnition is a direct generalization of the equilibrium
concept for strategic form games with only one criterion. In order to describe this deﬁnition we need to
generalize the notion of a best reply. This is done by means of the notion of vector domination. For two
vectors x and y in Rn we say that y dominates x if xi < yi holds for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; n. We will by the way also
write x6 y if xi6 yi for all i ¼ 1; . . . ; n.
Deﬁnition 1. Let q 2 DðNÞ be a strategy of player two. A strategy p 2 DðMÞ of player one is called a best
reply of player one against q if there is no other strategy p0 2 DðMÞ such that the payoﬀ vector p0Aq
dominates the payoﬀ vector pAq. The set of best replies of player one against q is denoted by BR1ðqÞ.
It almost goes without saying that we also can deﬁne best replies against a strategy p and the set BR2ðpÞ
for player two. Now the deﬁnition of equilibrium runs as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. A strategy pair ðp	; q	Þ is called an equilibrium if p	 is a best reply of player one against q	 and
q	 is a best reply of player two against p	.
Remark 1. It is also possible to deﬁne a more restrictive notion of equilibrium based on the dominance
relation on Rn deﬁned by ‘‘x dominates y if xi P yi for all i, and at least one of these inequalities is strict’’.
Since this relation does not necessarily yield a closed set of equilibria (see e.g. Borm et al., 1988), we decided
to use the weaker version. Nevertheless, proofs similar to the ones presented in this paper show that also in
this case we can ﬁnd a decomposition of the set of equilibria into a number of relative interiors of polytopes.
3. Stability regions and structure
In case of bimatrix games, the proof that the set of equilibria is a ﬁnite union of polytopes is based on the
fact that this set of equilibria can be chopped up in a ﬁnite number of sets. Then each of these sets can easily
be shown to be a polytope. It turns out to be worthwhile to execute this procedure for multicriteria games
as well.
3.1. Shapley’s result
First of all we need the result of Shapley (1959). Essentially Shapley (1959) provides a link between best
replies and linear programs. In order to describe this link we need to introduce some terminology.
Let ei denote the probability vector that puts all weight on pure strategy i. (In other words, it is the ith
unit vector.) Recall that for each criterion t 2 T the real number eiBtej is the payoﬀ of player two according
to his criterion t and Bt is the matrix whose entry on place i, j is this number eiBtej. Now suppose that player
two decides to assign a weight lt P 0 to each criterion t 2 T available to him (we assume that
P
t2T lt equals
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one). The vector l ¼ ðltÞt2T is called a weight vector. According to the criterion associated with this weight
vector the evaluation of the outcome ðei; ejÞ is the real number
X
t2T
lteiBtej ¼ ei
X
t2T
ltBt
 !
ej:
So, given the weight vector ðltÞt2T , player two in eﬀect uses the matrix
BðlÞ :¼
X
t2T
ltBt
to calculate his payoﬀ. With this terminology, the result of Shapley (1959) can be rephrased as follows.
Lemma 1. Let p be a strategy of player one and let q be a strategy of player two. Then the following two
statements are equivalent.
(i) q is a best reply of player two against p
(ii) there exists a weight vector l :¼ ðltÞt2T such that q is a best reply of player two against p according to the
criterion associated with BðlÞ.
In words, the lemma states that q is a best reply of player two against p if and only if player two can
assign to each criterion t 2 T a non-negative weight lt such that the resulting weighted criterion is maximal
in q, given that player one plays p.
3.2. The structure of the set of equilibria
In this section we will construct a decomposition of the set of equilibria of the game ðA;BÞ into a ﬁnite
number of sets that are easier to handle. This decomposition is in fact the multicriteria equivalent of the
technique that is used to prove that the set of equilibria of a bimatrix game is a ﬁnite union of polytopes. In
order to give the reader some background concerning the line of reasoning employed here, we will ﬁrst give
an informal discussion of this technique.
Suppose that we have a bimatrix game and a subset I of the set of pure strategies of player one. Then we
can associate two areas with this set, one in the set of mixed strategies of player one and one in the set of
mixed strategies of player two. For player one, this is the set DðIÞ of mixed strategies that put all weight
exclusively on the pure strategies in I, and for player two this is the set UðIÞ of mixed strategies of player
two against which (at least) all strategies in DðIÞ are best replies. (Such a set UðIÞ is called a stability region.)
Obviously we can do the same for a subset J of the set of pure strategies of player two.
Now the crucial point is that (for a bimatrix game) all these sets DðIÞ, DðJÞ, UðIÞ, and UðJÞ are polytopes
(and for each of these polytopes it is even possible to ﬁnd a describing system of linear inequalities). So, also
the set
ðDðIÞ \ UðJÞÞ  ðDðJÞ \ UðIÞÞ
is a polytope. Moreover there is only a ﬁnite number of such sets and it can be shown that their union equals
the set of equilibria of the given bimatrix game.
Although the sets UðIÞ and UðJÞ not necessarily need to be polytopes in the multicriteria case, we can
still carry out this procedure for two person multicriteria games.
To this end, let v be an element of Rn and let P be a polytope in Rn. Further, for two vectors x; y 2 Rn let
hx; yi :¼Pni¼1 xi  yi be the inner product of x and y. The vector v is said to attain its maximum over P in the
point x 2 P if
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hv; xiP hv; yi for all y 2 P :
Then we have the following well-known lemma.
Lemma 2. Let v be a vector in Rn. Further, let P be a polytope in Rn and let F be a face of P. If v attains its
maximum over P in some relative interior point x of F, then it also attains its maximum over P in any other
point of F.
Now let I be a subset of M. Slightly abusing notation we write DðIÞ for the set of strategies p 2 DðMÞ
whose carrier 2 is a subset of I. Further, the stability region UðIÞ (of player two) is deﬁned as
UðIÞ :¼ fq 2 DðNÞjDðIÞ  BR1ðqÞg:
Similarly we can deﬁne sets DðJÞ and UðJÞ for a subset J of N.
Theorem 1. The set of equilibria of the game ðA;BÞ equals the union over all I  M and J  N of the sets
ðDðIÞ \ UðJÞÞ  ðDðJÞ \ UðIÞÞ:
Proof. (a) Assume that a strategy pair ðp	; q	Þ is an element of a set ðDðIÞ \ UðJÞÞ  ðDðJÞ \ UðIÞÞ for some
subset I ofM and subset J of N. We will only show that p	 is a best reply against q	. Since q	 is an element of
UðIÞ, we know that any strategy in DðIÞ is a best reply against q	. However, p	 is an element of DðIÞ by
assumption. Hence, p	 is a best reply against q	.
(b) Conversely, let ðp	; q	Þ be an equilibrium. Take I ¼ Cðp	Þ and J ¼ Cðq	Þ. We will show that p	 is an
element of DðIÞ \ UðJÞ.
Obviously p	 is an element of DðIÞ. So we only need to show that p	 is also an element of UðJÞ. In other
words, we need to show that each strategy q 2 DðJÞ is a best reply against p	. To this end, take a q 2 DðJÞ.
Since q	 is a best reply against p	 we know by Lemma 1 that there exists a weight vector l ¼ ðltÞt2T such
that q	 is a best reply against p	 according to the criterion associated with BðlÞ. In other words, the vector
p	BðlÞ attains its maximum over DðNÞ in q	. However, since q	 is an element of the relative interior of DðJÞ,
p	BðlÞmust also attain its maximum in q by Lemma 2. Hence, q is a best reply against p	 according to BðlÞ,
and, again by Lemma 1, q is a best reply against p	. 
Clearly the sets DðIÞ and DðJÞ are polytopes for all subsets I of M and J of N. So, from the previous
theorem it follows that the set of equilibria of the game ðA;BÞ is a ﬁnite union of polytopes as soon as the
sets UðIÞ and UðJÞ are polytopes. Unfortunately this need not be the case. In the next section we will
provide a counterexample.
4. An example
We will give a fairly elaborate analysis of the counterexample. This is done because the calculations
involved in the determination of best replies and stability regions for this game are exemplary for such
calculations in general.
2 The carrier of a mixed strategy of a player is simply the collection of pure strategies of that player that get assigned positive
probability by the mixed strategy in question.
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There are two players in the game. Both players have three pure strategies. The pure strategies of player
one are called T,M, and B, the pure strategies of player two are called L, C, and R. Further, player one has
two criteria and player two has only one criterion. The payoﬀ for player two according to his criterion is
always zero. The payoﬀ matrix A of player one is
ð1; 1Þ ð0; 0Þ ð0; 0Þ
ð0; 0Þ ð4; 0Þ ð0; 0Þ
ð0; 0Þ ð0; 0Þ ð0; 4Þ
2
4
3
5:
Player one is the row player and player two is the column player. The ﬁrst digit in an entry gives the
evaluation by player one of the occurrence of that particular entry according to his ﬁrst criterion. The
second digit gives the evaluation according to his second criterion.
Since player two is completely indiﬀerent it is immediately clear that a strategy pair ðp	; q	Þ is an
equilibrium if and only if p	 is an element of BR1ðq	Þ. In other words, the set of equilibria equals the graph
of the best reply correspondence BR1. In order to calculate this graph we will ﬁrst compute the areas in the
strategy space of the second player where the best reply correspondence BR1 is constant. In other words, we
need to compute the stability regions of player two.
First of all note that if player two plays strategy q ¼ ðqL; qC; qRÞ and player one plays his pure strategy eT ,
the payoﬀ for player one is eTAq ¼ ðqL; qLÞ. This is a point on the line x ¼ y when plotted in the xy-plane.
Similarly, eMAq ¼ ð4qC; 0Þ is a point on the line y ¼ 0 and eBAq ¼ ð0; 4qRÞ is a point on the line x ¼ 0. Now
there are ﬁve possible situations as is depicted below.
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In situation I both eMAq and eBAq are dominated by eTAq. In situation II eTAq dominates eBAq, but does
not dominate eMAq. (Situation III is the symmetric situation with the roles of the second and third pure
strategy of player one interchanged.) In situation IV eTAq is itself undominated and dominates neither eMAq
nor eBAq, and V depicts the situation in which eTAq is dominated by some convex combination of eMAq and
eBAq.
Now if we calculate exactly where in the strategy space of player two these ﬁve situations occur we get
the picture below. The boldface Roman numbers in the various areas in this picture correspond to the
Roman numbers assigned to the situations depicted above. Notice that an area in the strategy space of
player two corresponding to one of the ﬁve situations above is necessarily of full dimension by the graphics
above. Further, one cannot jump from situation V to situations I, II or III without crossing the area where
situation IV occurs (except on the boundary of the strategy space).
The boundary line between areas I and II and areas III, IV and V is given by the equality qL ¼ 4qR.
Similarly, qL ¼ 4qC is the boundary between areas I and III and areas II, IV and V.
Finally, it can be seen in the graphics above that the boundary between area V and the others is exactly
the set of strategies where eTAq is an element of the line segment between eMAq and eBAq. This means that it
is the set of strategies for which ðqL; qLÞ satisﬁes the linear equation qRxþ qCy ¼ 4qCqR. Hence it must be the
set of strategies that satisfy the quadratic equation
qLqR þ qLqC ¼ 4qCqR
(except the solution ðqL; qC; qRÞ ¼ ð1; 0; 0Þ of this equation). This gives us enough information to write down
the stability regions of player two.
UðfTgÞ ¼ I [ II [ III [ IV
UðfMgÞ ¼ II [ IV [ V
UðfBgÞ ¼ III [ IV [ V
UðfT ;MgÞ ¼ II [ IV
UðfT ;BgÞ ¼ III [ IV
UðfM ;BgÞ ¼ V
486 P. Borm et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 148 (2003) 480–493
UðfT ;M ;BgÞ ¼ IV \ V:
Note the essential diﬀerences with the structure of stability regions for bimatrix games. For a bimatrix game
we would for example have the equality
UðfM ;BgÞ ¼ UðfMgÞ \ UðfBgÞ:
The example shows that this is no longer true for multicriteria games. In this case the set
UðfMgÞ \ UðfBgÞ ¼ IV [ V
subdivides into the areas IV, on whose relative interior
DðfT ;MgÞ [ DðfT ;BgÞ
is the set of best replies, and V, on whose relative interior the set of best replies is indeed DðfT ;M ;BgÞ. An
area like IV simply cannot occur for bimatrix games.
The second essential diﬀerence, and the main one in this section, is the fact that UðfT ;M ;BgÞ is a
quadratic curve. This means that the subset
DðfT ;M ;BgÞ  UðfT ;M ;BgÞ
of the set of equilibria cannot be written as a ﬁnite union of polytopes. This concludes the example.
5. Multicriteria games of size 23 n
The previous example shows that, in case at least one of the players has more than one criterion, the set
of equilibria may have a quadratic component as soon as both players have at least three pure strategies.
So, in the multicriteria case it is necessary to have (at least) one player who has exactly two pure strategies
to guarantee that the set of equilibria is indeed a ﬁnite union of polytopes. Therefore we assume from now
on that player one’s set of pure strategiesM equals fT ;Bg. In this section we will show that this assumption
is also suﬃcient, i.e., under this assumption the set of equilibria is indeed a ﬁnite union of polytopes. A
complication though is that we only have a polyhedral description of those polytopes when player two has
only one criterion.
5.1. Stability regions of player two
In this special case the analysis of the dominance relation on the possible payoﬀ vectors for player one
for a ﬁxed strategy q of player two is quite straightforward. Since player one has only two pure strategies eT
and eB, the set of possible payoﬀ vectors is a line segment (or a singleton in case eTAq ¼ eBAq) in RS . Given
this observation it is easy to check.
Lemma 3. The following two statements are equivalent.
(i) eTAq is dominated by pAq for some p 2 DðMÞ
(ii) eTAq is dominated by eBAq.
Given this lemma we can show that each stability region of player two is a ﬁnite union of polytopes. Two
cases are considered.
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Case 1. If the number jI j of elements of I equals one. Assume for the moment that I ¼ fTg. Then
UðIÞ ¼ fq 2 DðNÞjDðfT gÞ  BR1ðqÞg
¼ fq 2 DðNÞjeT 2 BR1ðqÞg
¼ fq 2 DðNÞjeTAq is not dominated by pAq for any p 2 DðMÞg
¼ fq 2 DðNÞjeTAq is not dominated by eBAqg
¼
[
s2S
fq 2 DðNÞjeTAsqP eBAsqg
where the fourth equality follows from the previous lemma. Clearly this last expression is a ﬁnite union of
polytopes. By the same line of reasoning we get that UðfBgÞ is a ﬁnite union of polytopes.
Case 2. For I ¼ fT ;Bg. Using Lemma 3 it is easy to check that UðIÞ is the set of strategies q for which eTAq
does not dominate eBAq and eBAq does not dominate eTAq. So, UðIÞ ¼ UðfTgÞ \ UðfBgÞ. Thus, since both
UðfTgÞ and UðfBgÞ are ﬁnite unions of polytopes as we saw in Case 1, UðIÞ is also a ﬁnite union of
polytopes.
5.2. Stability regions of player one
Now that we have come this far, the only thing left to prove is that the stability region
UðJÞ ¼ fp 2 DðMÞjDðJÞ  BR2ðpÞg
is a ﬁnite union of polytopes for each set J  N of pure strategies of player two. In order to do this we need
to do some preliminary work.
Let the subset V ðJÞ of DðMÞ  RT be deﬁned by
V ðJÞ :¼ fðp; lÞj DðJÞ is included in the set of best replies against p
according to the criterion BðlÞg
¼ fðp; lÞj DðJÞ is included in the set of strategies where the
vector pBðlÞ attains its maximum over DðNÞg:
Note that we allow pBðlÞ to attain its maximum in points outside DðJÞ as well. We only require that DðJÞ is
indeed a subset of the set of points where pBðlÞ attains its maximum over DðNÞ.
Further, let the projection p:R2  RT ! R2 be deﬁned by
pðp; vÞ :¼ p for all ðp; vÞ 2 R2  RT :
Now we can prove
Lemma 4. The stability region UðJÞ equals the projection pðV ðJÞÞ of the set V ðJÞ.
Proof. (a) Let p be an element of UðJÞ. We will show that p is also an element of pðV ðJÞÞ.
Let q	 be an element of the relative interior of DðJÞ. Since p is an element of UðJÞ we know that q	 is a
best reply to p. Then we know, by Lemma 1, that there is a weight vector l ¼ ðltÞt2T such that the vector
pBðlÞ attains its maximum over DðNÞ in q	. So, since q	 is a relative interior point of DðJÞ, pBðlÞ also attains
its maximum over DðNÞ in any other point of DðJÞ by Lemma 2. Therefore ðp; lÞ is an element of V ðJÞ and
p ¼ pðp; lÞ is an element of pðV ðJÞÞ.
(b) Conversely, let p ¼ pðp; lÞ be an element of pðV ðJÞÞ and let q be an element of DðJÞ. Then we know
that the vector pBðlÞ attains its maximum over DðNÞ in q. Again by Lemma 1, this means that q is a best
reply against p. Hence, since q was chosen arbitrarily in DðJÞ, p is an element of UðJÞ. 
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Now it is straightforward to show
Theorem 2. For a multicriteria game of size 2 n the stability region UðJÞ is a finite union of polytopes.
Proof. Observe that the set V ðJÞ is the collection of points ðp; lÞ 2 R2  RT that satisfy the system of
polynomial (in)equalities
pi P 0 i ¼ 1; 2
p1 þ p2 ¼ 1
lt P 0 for all t 2 TX
t2T
lt ¼ 1X
t2T
ltpBtej P
X
t2T
ltpBtek for all j 2 J and k 2 N :
Therefore, V ðJÞ is a semi-algebraic set. Furthermore, by the previous lemma, UðJÞ is the set of vectors
p 2 R2 such that there exists a l 2 RT for which
ðp; lÞ 2 V ðJÞ:
Hence, by the theorem of Tarski (1951) and Seidenberg (1954) (see e.g. Blume and Zame, 1994 for a clear
discussion of this theorem) UðJÞ is also a semi-algebraic set. Further, UðJÞ is compact, since V ðJÞ is
compact and p is continuous. So, UðJÞ is the union of a ﬁnite collection fSaga2A of sets Sa in DðMÞ and each
Sa is described by a ﬁnite number of polynomial inequalities
pa;kðxÞP 0 ðk ¼ 1; . . . ;mðaÞÞ:
However, DðMÞ is a line segment in R2. So the set of points in DðMÞ that satisﬁes one particular inequality is
the ﬁnite union of (closed) line segments (singletons also count as line segments). So, since each Sa is the
intersection of such ﬁnite unions, Sa is itself the ﬁnite union of closed line segments. Therefore, since UðJÞ is
the ﬁnite union over all sets Sa, it is the ﬁnite union of closed line segments. Hence, UðJÞ is a ﬁnite union of
polytopes. 
We will illustrate this result in the next elaborate example.
Example 1. Consider the following multicriteria 2 3 bimatrix game in which each player has two criteria.
A ¼ ð0; 2Þ ð0; 0Þ ð2; 0Þð1; 0Þ ð1; 1Þ ð0; 1Þ

 
and B ¼ ð3; 0Þ ð2; 2Þ ð5; 5Þð0; 3Þ ð2; 2Þ ð10;10Þ

 
:
We will ﬁrst analyse the best responses of player I against an arbitrary mixed strategy q ¼ ðq1; q2; q3Þ of
player II. Consider to this end the payoﬀ matrices
A1 ¼ 0 0 2
1 1 0

 
and A2 ¼ 2 0 0
0 1 1

 
corresponding to his two respective criteria. According to the ﬁrst criterion T is at least as good as B if and
only if q3 P 1=3. According to the second criterion T is at least as good as B if and only if q1 P 1=3. Using
the line of reasoning immediately following Lemma 3 we get the following stability regions.
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The stability region UðfTgÞ is the set of strategies q ¼ ðq1; q2; q3Þ for which q1 P 1=3 or
for which q3 P 1=3. In the same way we ﬁnd that UðfBgÞ consists of those strategies for which q16 1=3 or
for which q36 1=3. Taking the appropriate intersections, we ﬁnd that UðfT ;BgÞ is the set of strategies for
which q16 1=3 and q3 P 1=3 holds, or q1 P 1=3 and q36 1=3.
Next we will determine the stability regions of player II. Consider his payoﬀ matrices
B1 ¼ 3 2 50 2 10

 
and B2 ¼ 0 2 53 2 10

 
:
This shows us that, when player I plays ðp; 1 pÞ, player II is confronted with payoﬀs
ð3p; 2; 15p  10Þ and ð3 3p; 2; 15p  10Þ
according to his ﬁrst and second criterion respectively. In other words, if player II plays L, his payoﬀ vector is
ð3p; 3 3pÞ, ð2; 2Þ when he plays C, and ð15p  10; 15p  10Þ when he plays R. Graphically speaking, when
plotted in the xy-plane, the latter two payoﬀ vectors are on the line x ¼ y, while the ﬁrst payoﬀ vector lies
somewhere on the line xþ y ¼ 3. Thus, while varying the probability p that player I playsT, we can get several
situations, eg. the one depicted below (the x-axis corresponds to the ﬁrst criterion, the y-axis to the second).
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Clearly this situation, in which playing R is better than playing any other strategy, occurs for values of
p close to one. More precisely, for those values of p for which 15p  10P 2, 15p  10P 3p and
15p  10P 3 3p. In other words, whenever pP 5=6.
A few simple computations show that the next situations we will encounter when we decrease p further
look as follows.
Summing up, the best reply correspondence of player II looks as depicted in the diagram below. Al-
though we only denoted the pure best responses in this diagram, the above graphics show that also all
convex combinations of these pure best responses are best responses. (Notice that, in contrast with the
classical bimatrix context, this is not always automatically true!) Of course we also have that on switch
points all neighboring best responses remain best responses. For example, the set of best responses to
p ¼ 4=5 is the collection of all convex combinations of L, C and R (in other words, the entire strategy space
of player II).
Some remarks are in place here. Notice for example the sequence LC, C, LC in this diagram. This type of
behavior can never occur in single-criterion bimatrix games. Also the fact that the area where LC occurs is
of full dimension is typical for the multicriterion setting. In the single criterion setting this will always be a
degenerate situation.
P. Borm et al. / European Journal of Operational Research 148 (2003) 480–493 491
Now we can combine the best reply correspondences of both players and compute all Pareto equilibria of
this game. Working our way up from left to right along the best response diagram of player I, we ﬁnd the
following polytopes.
ðð0; 1Þðq; 1 q; 0ÞÞ for 06 q6 1
ððp; 1 pÞðq; 1 q; 0ÞÞ for p6 1
3
and qP
1
3
ððp; 1 pÞðq; 1 q; 0ÞÞ for 2
3
6 p6 4
5
and qP
1
3
4
5
;
1
5
 
ðq1; q2; q3Þ
 
for q1 P
1
3
and q36
1
3
4
5
;
1
5
 
ðq1; q2; q3Þ
 
for q16
1
3
and q3 P
1
3
ððp; 1 pÞð0; 0; 1ÞÞ for 5
6
6 p6 1:
Although this example was relatively easy to analyse, the underlying principle is valid for all 2 n games.
Even though diﬀerent possibilities for the stability regions of player II will in general be given by poly-
nomial inequalities, there is still only a ﬁnite number of critical values of p that function as boundary
between diﬀerent situations due to the one-dimensional character of the variable p. Thus we still get in-
tervals of values of p for each consecutive situation.
5.3. The case jT j ¼ 1
In this case we have a complete polyhedral description of the polytopes involved in the union. Notice
that we already know that the sets DðIÞ and DðJÞ are polytopes, and the sets UðIÞ and UðJÞ are ﬁnite unions
of polytopes. We will now show that a polyhedral description of all these polytopes can be found.
For the polytopes DðIÞ, DðJÞ this polyhedral description is trivial. For UðIÞ we saw in Case 1 below
Lemma 3 that it is the ﬁnite union of polytopes of the form
fq 2 DðNÞjeTAsqP eBAsqg:
So, in Case 1 the polytopes involved in the union are already given by linear inequalities. This implies that
also in Case 2 we can ﬁnd the linear inequalities that describe the polytopes involved. Finally, for J  N , we
get
UðJÞ ¼ fp 2 DðMÞjDðJÞ  BR2ðpÞg ¼ fp 2 DðMÞjpBej P pBek for all j 2 J and k 2 Ng:
The assumption that jT j ¼ 1 is used in the second equality. The last expression in the display now shows
that UðJÞ is itself a polytope that can be written as the solution set of a ﬁnite number of linear inequalities.
This concludes the argumentation.
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